[War_ooc] Food for thought

[Daniel Garcia]

 From what you've excerpted, the idea put forward does seem  
interesting, though in the end I have to disagree.  Certainly in the  
current situation, I can see how a spoiling attack approach, while  
being very devilish of us, would in the end benefit us.  After all,  
if the Middle East is busy fighting itself, it might absorb efforts  
that might otherwise be directed at American or Allied soil.  On the  
other hand, there could be significant economic consequences  
( *cough*oil*cough* ), and certainly will screw up the region for a  
significant period, particularly if Iraq decides to shatter into  
pieces.  That's a situation that conceivably might lead to a war in  
the region which could involve Turkey, a US ally.  Which could drag  
us back in in some way.

As to earlier instances, I'm not sure what we were supposed to be  
spoiling with regard to Korea or Vietnam.  In the former case we were  
coming to the aid of an ally, which thanks to our intervention is  
still around and is a free, prosperous country today.  Of course,  
there was a period when we were winning spectacularly when we thought  
we could reunite Korea.  We were brought back to Earth by the Chinese  
intervention.  Vietnam was another "defend an ally" type situation,  
except we went to more meager efforts in this regard than in Korea  
(we never invaded North Vietnam...), and in the end we didn't save  
our ally.

As to Cuba and Iran, we didn't even go as far as Vietnam.  There was  
the Bay of Pigs with regard to Cuba, and if I recall correctly, we  
did try to rescue the hostages in Iran (which failed badly and I  
think gave them more hostages).  Beyond that, and the missile crisis  
in Cuba which amounted to brinksmanship over an issue which was I  
would say only debatably important, we kind of took a "we'll sit them  
out" attitude.  I don't know how that was spoiling anything, except  
in the case of the missile crisis which was most definitely a  
spoiling move.

I just don't see this "spoiling strategy", whether conscious or  
unconscious.  After all, what have we been spoiling?  Besides, I  
think there's a much better and more plausible explanation for  
American grand strategic success at the expense of numerous tactical  
and even strategic defeats.  It is, as Bill Clinton said, the  
economy, stupid.  (Couldn't resist... :) )

Think of it this way.  We have a tendency to give up at a certain  
point.  We scale back our objectives, and/or decide to withdraw  
entirely, or in the case of Cuba and Iran, to not intervene at all in  
the first place.  Now, whatever the reason for our doing this, I  
think it's analogous to a business which has tried to enter a new  
line of business.  It starts with clear, ambitious goals, but as the  
reality of that market sets in, and the bottom line weighs more  
heavily on the heads of executives, they face the choice of  
continuing to spend large sums on the venture, possibly risking the  
solvency of the company (all the while the company's original  
business lines keep doing well and are still profitable), or to cut  
their losses and get the heck out.  We get into new ventures  
(interventions and the like) with high hopes and expectations, but  
often times things don't work out, and the pressure comes from the  
public (which could be analogous to the shareholders of the company  
in the example above) to end the venture.  To much money has been  
spent, to many lives lost, and we haven't accomplished many of our  
goals, if any at all.  So, we finally, after a time, cut our losses  
and leave.  And for the next hundred years, conservative pundits  
blame the liberals for our failure, and liberal pundits blame  
conservatives for getting us into the mess in the first place (or  
whatever variation on that theme is appropriate).

But the key point is that the amount of effort and resources we  
commit to a venture is generally small compared to the amount we are  
capable of committing.  I'm not sure on exact figures for the Iraq  
War (or Vietnam and the others for that matter), but say we spend  
$200 billion a year on it.  That's something about under 2% of GDP  
(for numbers, I'm using that the US economy is about $12 trillion in  
size), which while being a fair amount, isn't 5% or 7% of GDP.  And  
if we wanted, I'm sure we could spend that much.  So while we spend a  
lot (after all, we do take the war seriously even if, as is now the  
case, there is a big push for leaving), we don't spend as much effort  
as we are capable of expending.  Moreover, it's pretty clear that  
we're going to leave Iraq in the next few years.  Politically it's  
become impossible to stay.  I don't know how much we've spent on the  
war (I vaguely remembering at some point we passed the half trillion  
mark), but let's suppose that we leave next year (as the Dems,  
finally growing a spine, are proposing) and the total cost is one  
trillion dollars spent on the war.  In the fall of 2008, we'll have  
been in for five and a half years, so the cumulative GDP for that  
period is about $66 trillion.  Thus, we would have spent under 2%  
(close to 1.5% according to my simplified calculations) of our  
cumulative GDP on this (granted here, that there may/will be  
continuing costs accrued from the war).  Now, that's a lot, but it's  
limited.  Again, we haven't spent 5% or more or anything.  When we  
leave, we'll be out a trillion dollars, several thousand American  
lives will have been lost outright, and tens of thousands of American  
lives will have been deeply affected (wounded, psychological issues,  
etc).  Compared to Vietnam, these numbers (in terms of lives lost),  
while regrettable, aren't huge.  We lost on the order of 50,000 lives  
in Vietnam if I recall.

So, what's my point?  My point is that in the end, our priority has  
never really been success at all costs.  As a country, there are  
certain costs we are willing to bear, and beyond that point we are  
willing (enthused even) to cut our losses and leave.  And despite all  
the moral and conscience issues associated with this course, it  
sharply limits our economic liability.  Again, it's the economy,  
stupid.  In the larger, even historical sense, the foundation upon  
which any great power's power has been built is economics.  The  
United States became a great power almost by default due to our  
increasing economic clout.  We remain the sole superpower in large  
part because the US economy is so huge.  It accounts for over 1/4th  
the total world economy.  Looking back through history, Britain's  
power was built upon an economy which was basically the first in the  
world to industrialize, and which had become the dominant trading  
power even before that.  Prussia rose to power on the backs of French  
protestants who left the religious troubles of France for Prussia's  
open arms, which gave Prussia a nice economic boost which it used to  
build a famously great army.  The Dutch were a great power for a  
time, due to their merchant wealth.  France was more or less been a  
great power for a long time because it's size and population were  
large enough that their economy was always significant.  Spain built  
their power partly upon wise dynastic moves, but also prominently due  
to the false economic boost of American gold.  China dominated East  
Asia until the 1800's due to their tremendous economic clout, which  
was in part due to their population size again.  There are probably  
some exceptions (the Mongols and such come to mind), but it's  
certainly true that within the last 200-300 years the maxim that  
economic power must precede great power-dom seems pretty solid, and  
indeed seems to get better with each passing decade.

The United States, by limiting its commitments is preserving its  
economic dominance, limiting the harm to its economy which might come  
from heavier commitments over longer periods.  We focus on economic  
growth and prosperity, and this allows us to continue to be the  
dominant world power (though I also think the US has other advantages  
in this regard, the economy is the big thing).  I would contend that  
the Cold War was, in the end, less of a diplomatic or military  
contest, than an economic one.  Early on, the threat the Soviets  
posed was partly due to the fact that their communist system was  
producing large (if in the end unbalanced) economic gains and  
growth.  It allowed them to, for a brief period, compete  
technologically even.  This mostly happened in the 1950's and to a  
somewhat lesser extent in the 60's.  Looking back, these corresponded  
to the times of greatest competition between the two superpowers.  Of  
course, during this time, the US was setting the stage for the events  
which would see it leap unassailably ahead of the USSR in the  
economic sphere (the invention and refinement of computers  
particularly).  The 1970's were kind of a wash for both sides, the US  
with the oil crises and the USSR with it arguably reaching the  
boundaries of what a centrally planned economy could accomplish.  Of  
course, towards the end of the 1970's, you had in the US the  
beginning of the rise of Silicon Valley, with the roots of Microsoft,  
Apple, and the PC revolution's seeds being sown.  In the USSR, there  
was nothing comparable.  Thus, the 1980's, in addition to the USSR  
having it's own little Vietnam (Afghanistan), their economy continued  
to stagnate, while the American economy, after a bit of tough  
medicine early on, began to boom in a big way, and the technology  
revolution got under way (Nintendo anyone?  I seem to remember  
reading a quote by someone from the former Soviet leadership saying  
something to the effect that they knew they were doomed when the  
GameBoy came out;  they simply couldn't match either the technology  
or the economics which went into making it possible for that  
technology to be put into kids toys...).  In the end, the Soviets  
fell behind, and for whatever reason (I'm not gonna try to explain  
the fall of the USSR here...) fell apart, while the American economy  
continued to grow strongly and become more technologically  
sophisticated.  In someways, I'm not entirely sure it's coincidental  
that the late 1990's, before the rise of China and India, when the US  
was tremendously and overpoweringly in the lead economically and was  
hugely dominant on the international scene, was also the time of the  
Dot Com Boom, perhaps the height of the American tech economy (even  
if a lot of it turned out to be false prognostications and poor  
financial decisions) and certainly the post Cold War feel-good peak  
(before George Bush the Divisive).

In any case, if you managed to read all that, then congratulations, I  
certainly hadn't planned on writing that much.  :)  So, one more time:

It's the economy, stupid.

Dan



On Mar 28, 2007, at 8:23 AM, pentaj2 at Scranton.edu wrote:

> http://www.defensetech.org/archives/003384.html:
> ---
> It’s the kind of thing that might be more appropriate to post on, say,
> a Sunday so you can read it with a mug of coffee and some time to
> think. But I didn’t want this one to grow stale.
>
> Though it’s a subscriber site, DT has a line on a few analytical
> pieces from the private intelligence firm, Stratfor. They can be a bit
> in the weeds at times, but this one is a big chunk of food for thought
> as it attempts to answer the fundamental question of why the United
> States seems to get itself in conflicts that end in stalemate.
>
> The muddled result of the war in Iraq may not have been such a
> surprise after all, and, in some twisted way, may serve America’s
> overall purpose in the global war on terrorism – though
> unintentionally – Stratfor says.
>
> Excerpts of the intel analysis follow:
>
> …In considering the situation, our attention is drawn to a strange
> paradox that has been manifest in American foreign policy since World
> War II. On the one hand, the United States has consistently
> encountered strategic stalemate or defeat in particular politico-
> military operations. At those times, the outcomes have appeared to be
> disappointing if not catastrophic. Yet, over the same period of time,
> U.S. global power, on the whole, has surged. In spite of stalemate and
> defeat during the Cold War, the United States was more in 2000 than it
> had been in 1950…
>
>
> …Put somewhat differently, there is the liberal view that the Soviet
> Union was not defeated by the United States in the Cold War, but that
> it collapsed itself, and the military conflicts of the Cold War were
> unnecessary. There is the conservative view that the United States won
> the Cold War in spite of a fundamental flaw in the American  
> character -
> - an unwillingness to bear the burden of war -- and that this flaw
> ultimately will prove disastrous for the United States. Finally, there
> is the non-ideological, non-political view that the United States won
> the Cold War in spite of defeats and stalemates because these wars
> were never as important as either the liberals or conservatives made
> them out to be, however necessary they might have been seen to be at
> the time…
>
> …If we apply these analyses to Iraq, three schools of thought emerge.
> The first says that the Iraq war is unnecessary and even harmful in
> the context of the U.S.-jihadist confrontation -- and that, regardless
> of outcome, it should not be fought. The second says that the war is
> essential -- and that, while defeat or stalemate in this conflict
> perhaps would not be catastrophic to the United States, there is a
> possibility that it would be catastrophic. And at any rate, this
> argument continues, the United States' ongoing inability to impose its
> will in conflicts of this class ultimately will destroy it. Finally,
> there is the view that Iraq is simply a small piece of a bigger war
> and that the outcome of this particular conflict will not be decisive,
> although the war might be necessary. The heated rhetoric surrounding
> the Iraq conflict stems from the traditional American inability to
> hold things in perspective…
>
> …Even in cases where the enemy was engaged fully, the United States
> limited its commitment of resources. In Vietnam, for example, the
> defeat of North Vietnam and regime change were explicitly ruled out.
> The United States had as its explicit goal a stalemate, in which both
> South and North Vietnam survived as independent states. In Korea, the
> United States shifted to a stalemate strategy after the Chinese
> intervention. So too in Cuba after the Cuban missile crisis; and in
> Iran, the United States accepted defeat in an apparently critical
> arena without attempting a major intervention. In each instance, the
> mark of U.S. intervention was limited exposure -- even at the cost of
> stalemate or defeat…
>
> …In other words, the United States consistently has entered into
> conflicts in which its level of commitment was extremely limited, in
> which either victory was not the strategic goal or the mission
> eventually was redefined to accept stalemate, and in which even defeat
> was deemed preferable to a level of effort that might avert it. Public
> discussion on all sides was apoplectic both during these conflicts and
> afterward, yet American global power was not materially affected in
> the long run...
>
> …This appears to make no sense until we introduce a military concept
> into the analysis: the spoiling attack. The spoiling attack is an
> offensive operation; however, its goal is not to defeat the enemy but
> to disrupt enemy offensives -- to, in effect, prevent a defeat by the
> enemy. The success of the spoiling attack is not measured in term of
> enemy capitulation, but the degree to which it has forestalled
> successful enemy operations…
>
> …The invasion four years ago has led to the Sunnis and Shia turning
> against each other in direct conflict. Therefore, it could be argued
> that just as the United States won the Cold War by exploiting the  
> Sino-
> Soviet split and allying with Mao Zedong, so too the path to defeating
> the jihadists is not a main attack, but a spoiling attack that turns
> Sunnis and Shia against each other. This was certainly not the intent
> of the Bush administration in planning the 2003 invasion; it has
> become, nevertheless, an unintended and significant outcome…
>
> …Moreover, it is far from clear whether U.S. policymakers through
> history have been aware of this dimension in their operations. In
> considering Korea, Cuba, Vietnam and Iran, it is never clear that the
> Truman, Kennedy, Johnson/Nixon or Carter/Reagan administrations
> purposely set out to implement a spoiling attack. The fog of political
> rhetoric and the bureaucratized nature of the U.S. foreign policy
> apparatus make it difficult to speak of U.S. "strategy" as such. Every
> deputy assistant secretary of something-or-other confuses his little
> piece of things with the whole, and the American culture demonizes and
> deifies without clarifying…
>
> …However, there is a deep structure in U.S. foreign policy that
> becomes visible. The incongruities of stalemate and defeat on the one
> side and growing U.S. power on the other must be reconciled. The
> liberal and conservative arguments explain things only partially. But
> the idea that the United States rarely fights to win can be explained.
> It is not because of a lack of moral fiber, as conservatives would
> argue; nor a random and needless belligerence, as liberals would
> argue. Rather, it is the application of the principle of spoiling
> operations -- using limited resources not in order to defeat the enemy
> but to disrupt and confuse enemy operations…
>
> I know it’s heavy reading for a Monday morning, but it’s worth
> considering as the Iraq war grinds on without any clear momentum
> toward “victory” or even “success.”
> ---
>
> I dislike debating Iraq; I agree with anybody else it is more or less
> a screwup. But the idea - that maybe we don't need to win, just shake
> things up - seems plausible.
>
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