[War] South Korea: Korea's Strategic Dilemma

[Daniel Garcia]

"Republic of Korea:  Korea's Strategic Dilemma"
Unnamed President
February 20, 2013

(OOC:  This is a one off post from the perspective of the South  
Koreans to give them a voice and let their position and intentions be  
known.  No names have been used so that someone taking control of the  
country at a later date would have minimal baggage.)

"What is the situation over there, now," the President asked.  No one  
needed to ask where 'over there' was.  In Korean government circles  
at the moment, there was only one 'there'.

Moreover, there was only now one Korea.  The Chinese had occupied the  
former Democratic People's Republic of Korea, more simply known as  
North Korea.  South Korea's government had been quiet in the  
meantime, to an outside observer.  To someone on the inside, all was  
confusion and debate.

"The Chinese are continuing to negotiate with several of the  
'warlords', and have managed to convince another one to more or less  
disarm.  However, many of the warlords near the DMZ apparently remain  
obstinate.  The Chinese and the warlords have split numerous portions  
of the DMZ between themselves.  There isn't any fighting, but things  
appear to be uneasy," a security advisor said.

"Reports also continue to come in," the Minister of Unification  
pointed out, "of the poor conditions over there.  There's a high  
degree of starvation and privation.  The public is very concerned."

"I see," the President said, nodding in thought for a moment.  "And  
what of the Chinese dispositions?"

"They're more or less spread out, controlling the key centers of  
population, and much of the DMZ," the Minister of National Defense  
said.  "With regard to the DMZ, it seems to be a secondary concern to  
them, so our forces are in no danger.  They also have concentrations  
of troops near the edges of territory where warlords continue to  
prevaricate.  It seems the commanders on the ground prefer to settle  
things at this point with diplomacy rather than fighting in order to  
prevent unnecessary casualties.  This is why some sectors of the DMZ  
remain under warlord control, though the most important sectors are  
under Chinese control.  They were quite insistent on that point.

"Additional forces are poised along the Yalu River, though these  
appear to be more to seal off the country than anything.  And the  
country is sealed fairly tight.  All in all, they're deployed to keep  
control of the country and not for any further adventures.  I think  
it's safe to say they have no desire to move further south."

No matter how many times this last had been reiterated in government  
circles, there was still a high degree of uneasiness at having  
Chinese troops just across the border.

"How effective is the Chinese control of the country," the President  
asked.  The security advisor spoke up.

"It appears that in some areas, particularly P'yongyang, Kaesong, and  
generally the areas along the western shore and the Chinese border.   
Many of the other urban areas are also well controlled, though  
P'yonggang seems to be largely controlled by a warlord.  The  
countryside, on the other hand, particularly in the more mountainous  
east and north-east, seems to only technically controlled by the  
Chinese.  This is particularly worrying given the large number of  
small arms which are unaccounted for.  These areas are strategically  
less important to the Chinese, but the danger is that they are  
geographically perfect bases for an insurgency:  rough terrain, poor  
roads, and just enough people to provide support and shelter.   
Moreover, because these areas are somewhat lower priority, the number  
of Korean speakers in units near these areas is relatively lower."

The President slumped in thought for a moment.

"So what do we do," the President said, finally.

The room was silent.  The whole crisis had been spent absorbing  
information.  There had been almost an unspoken agreement not to  
discuss what to do once it became clear the Americans would not  
support an armed rush into the north.  It was if that act had been  
all that the South Korean, and now just the Korean, government could  
muster the willpower to do.  But now, as the situation settled  
somewhat, the issue could be avoided no longer.

"What do we do now," the President repeated.  It was here that the  
Minister of Unification spoke up, after several uncomfortable moments  
of silence in which everyone knew what they had to say but needed to  
build up the courage and will to do so.

"I think the easiest part of this issue is humanitarian," the  
Minister of Unification began.  "The people of the north are  
starving.  While I have no doubt that the Chinese are doing the best  
they can, I believe it is important that we also take a large role in  
alleviating the food crisis in the north.  Looking to the future, if  
we are to have any hopes for successful reunification, we must begin  
to address the needs and aspirations of the people of the north.  Our  
government, if it ever hopes to be the government of all Korea, must  
take an active, highly visible, and effective role in addressing the  
food shortage in the north."

"That means we need Chinese cooperation," the Minister of Foreign  
Affairs and Trade pointed out.

"And we know very little about the intentions of the Chinese in the  
north," added the security advisor.  "I think our first and most  
important task must be to understand what the plans of China are.   
They may intend to annex the north, but I find that doubtful.  I am  
also dubious that they intend to simply turn over the north to our  
control.  Just as we are uncomfortable with the Chinese military  
standing to at the DMZ, how would the Chinese feel with our forces at  
the Yalu River?  We are, whatever differences we have, allies of the  
United States.  How would the Chinese government feel about having an  
American ally at their doorstep?"

"What do you think they're likely action will be," asked the President.

"They will probably set up a new puppet regime, this one more firmly  
under their control," the security advisor said.  "It would continue  
to act as a buffer, and they could ensure that conditions wouldn't be  
so bad.  They could even set up a mock democratic process, though it  
wouldn't be a truly free state."

"That would be difficult, wouldn't it," interjected the Minister of  
Unification.  "After all, reunification is the natural outcome.  And  
with the prospect of internal resistance, would they not seek to  
extricate themselves from the situation?"

"I think the Chinese would have no qualms about crushing this  
resistance," the security advisor retorted.  The Minister of Foreign  
Affairs and Trade stepped in here.

"I wouldn't be so sure.  Over the past several years, particularly  
beginning in the lead up to the Beijing Olympics, the Chinese  
government has become more and more conscious about how it appears to  
the outside world.  Depending upon developments in the international  
community, it may seem wiser for them to extricate themselves, or at  
least to invite large scale international participation.  I have no  
doubt they will try to strongly influence the outcome, but I also  
think that they will believe it to be impracticable to handle the  
northern situation on their own and in the face of some degree of  
international protest."

"What has the reaction of the international community been to date,"  
the President asked.

"The United States and France have come out, together, pressing the  
Chinese as to their plans and designs on the north," the Minister of  
Foreign Affairs and Trade answered.  "Beyond that, they appear to be  
taking a wait and see approach.  Both the Americans and the Europeans  
are obviously concerned, and seem to be willing to support most  
actions we could take, though obviously they also don't want  
conflict.  The Japanese have been silent and inscrutable."

"Diplomatically, what course do you advise," the President asked.

"I think, for the time being, we need to find out what the Chinese  
intend to do, what their plans are," the Minister of Foreign Affairs  
and Trade said.  "We should approach the Chinese, engage them about  
the north.  Ask what their plans are, and press them on the issue of  
democracy and, more subtly, reunification.  More straightforwardly,  
as the Minister of Unification suggested, we should also ask to  
assist heavily in humanitarian efforts in the north.  That should be  
our most proactive diplomatic point, I think, given its stated  
importance."

The President nodded before looking around the room and asking if  
there were serious objections to this policy.  The Minister of  
National Defense made one point.

"Should we perhaps also offer security forces for deployment in the  
north.  I think it is important that we involve ourselves as strongly  
as possible in the north, get as many of our people up there."

"I disagree, at least in terms of the immediate prospects," the  
Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade replied.  "Not until we know  
the intentions of the Chinese.  If they have designs on the north,  
proposing to send armed troops to the north could make them look less  
kindly upon our other proposals.  We need to take this slow and  
methodically."

"I agree," said the President, cutting off a reply from the Minister  
of National Defense.  "Please make such contacts for these  
arrangements as you can after this meeting."

The President leaned forward now, head bowed somewhat.  The President  
then looked around the table before the next question.

"Suppose that the Chinese have designs upon the north, specifically  
designs which preclude unification.  How do we respond?"

That was, it seemed, the $64,000 question.  On the one hand, China,  
certainly compared to Korea, was a juggernaut.  And recently she had  
even risen among the ranks of the world's great powers.  If the  
Chinese decided something that the Koreans, or most anyone else,  
didn't like, the going would be rough from there.  Unification was  
important to Korea, and the President's question cut to the heart of  
the Korean strategic dilemma:  given that Korea's resources and power  
was strictly limited, and that her allies had so far expressed a  
desire to keep limit their involvement and were likely to be aghast  
at the possibility of a Second Korean War, how far could and should  
Korea go in attempting to achieve its aim of unification with the north?

"The prospects of a full scale armed conflict would be dim," the  
Minister for National Defense said slowly.  "Particularly without the  
assistance of allies.  Thus, short of the acquiescence or departure  
of the Chinese, the majority of the military will not be able to  
affect things, and thus makes overt armed actions unlikely to be  
beneficial."

"Overt armed actions," said the President, "but what about covert.   
Your statement implies a difference."

"It is feasible," the security advisor started, "that a large scale  
resistance movement could be supported.  Given that the Chinese can't  
seem to find a large amount of small arms, weaponry shouldn't be very  
problematic.  The issues will be how, without overly provoking the  
Chinese government into retaliating, to support an insurgency.  The  
primary things we would need to provide, at least at the start, are  
food, medical supplies, intelligence, and organizational assistance.   
The first and last, given the situation in the north, will be very  
important.  If the Chinese are able to control the food supply in the  
north, which is the direction of developments, they would have a  
powerful means of combating an unassisted insurgency.  It is likely  
that we would need to provide food assistance in some manner directly  
to the insurgency.

"The other major concern will be the organization of the insurgents,"  
the security advisor continued.  "Given that our goal is unification,  
it would be of no use to use to provide for and support an insurgency  
which we can not control.  After all, if the Chinese do withdraw, we  
do not want the insurgents to set up a new regime of their own but  
pave the way for the extension of our government into the north.  We  
need to be able to either absorb or demobilize any insurgency at any  
point at which we come into possession of the north.  Otherwise, we  
will find ourselves back to square one, or worse."

"I should point out, perhaps," the Minister of Foreign Affairs and  
Trade said, "that I have heard rumors that the Americans might be  
willing to help support such an operation to support an insurgency in  
the north.  I do not know how serious they are, or if this rumor is  
even correct.  But it is worth considering."

The President nodded in thought, and came to a decision.

"Begin planning for operations in support of an insurgency against  
the Chinese in the north," the President ordered.  "Such planning  
should place the highest importance in having substantial power over  
the command and control of such operations, whether directed by  
personnel here in the south or by personnel sent into the north.  The  
object of such an insurgency should be to force the Chinese to  
withdraw from the north if they do not wish to do so of their own  
accord.  It should also be the object of such an insurgency to  
achieve unification, and thus is allowed for by operations lay the  
groundwork for this goal.

"While these plans are being drawn up, diplomatic efforts will be  
given our full force and attention.  Firstly, to ascertain the  
intentions of the Chinese.  Secondly, to push the Chinese to withdraw  
and allow for unification.  Thirdly, to get the Chinese to allow us  
to conduct humanitarian operations in the north as soon as possible.   
And fourthly, to engage our allies and convince them to similarly  
exert such pressure.  In this last regard, we should quietly and  
secretly engage our allies in talks about possible support, material  
or just moral and diplomatic, for an insurgency should the Chinese  
impede unification."

There the meeting ended, and a few minutes later the President was  
still sitting, alone, and lost in thought and contemplation.


ACTIONS:

1)  South Korea will ask the Chinese government to allow a  
substantial Korean humanitarian program to begin operating in the  
former North Korea.

2)  South Korea will enquire as to China's intentions in the north,  
and press the Chinese government to allow for the near or middle term  
unification of Korea.  It should be made clear that the South Korean  
government finds this to be very important.

3)  South Korea will begin planning to support an insurgency in the  
north should the Chinese government appear to have or announce  
intentions to either stay in occupation of the former North Korea for  
a long time, or plan to install a new puppet regime there.  This will  
be done quietly, and is only in the planning stages.

4)  South Korea will seek the support of its allies and of the  
international community in its aim for unification.  In the case of  
planning for a possible insurgency, South Korea will quietly and  
secretly approach its allies for support, diplomatic, material, or  
otherwise.