[War] Japan: "Help from Our Friends
Ian Martell
martellian at hotmail.com
Wed Sep 27 19:47:52 EDT 2006
"Help from Our Friends"
Defence Minister Tadao Inoue
Japan
September 27th 2006
Tadao Inoue was hardly the sort of man youd expect to be in charge of the
worlds sixth best funded military organization on the planet, even on
paper. He was a short man of nearly sixty whos hair had long since
retreated to a grey arch across the back and sides of his head and whos
eyes were framed by a set of thick glasses. However appearances were
deceiving and in the scant few months that he had been in charge of the
Defence Agency (Japan not officially having a Ministry of Defence) had
quickly took charge and made it clear to those who worked for him in and out
of uniform, that the constitution stipulated that the JSDF must be under
civilian control, and he was the voice of that control.
As such General Tanaka the Chairman of the Branch Chiefs; Vice-Minister
Watanabe and Brigadier General Asao Fukudome stat patiently waiting while
the Minister finished a phone call with the Minister of Foreign Affairs
returning from his trip from the United Kingdom.
I see, yes, of course
I will see you when you get back Kin-kun, Inoue
said and then hung up the phone.
The British have accepted our proposal, Fukudome said.
Tanaka made a grunt of acknowledgment. He had not been shy in letting the
Minister know he disagreed with Watanabes plan to bring in foreign
militaries to advise the JSDF about how to best reform their forces. It was
a blow to the pride of the Forces in his eyes.
And the deployment? asked Watanabe.
They agreed of course. General Fukudome, how long does planning bureau
expect to the deployment will take?
From approval to complete deployment, about three weeks, Fukudome said and
paused to see if the Minister wanted more and it was clear that he did. We
would be sending the helicopters themselves by ship from Yokusuka, meanwhile
the crews and pilots would be flown ahead to the theatre to be briefed on
their operational expectations and get a feel for what they will be in for.
Inoue nodded. How long will the tours last?
That would depend on the length of the deployment.
Six-months, replied Inoue.
Two to three month tours then, said Fukudome. Anything less than two
months is a waste of resources, and more than three and the next group
doesnt get as much experience as the first group.
The British proposal for Japanese troops to go to Afghanistan had come at an
auspicious time for the Planning Bureau who had been tasked with working out
with two-battalion sized peacekeeping force supported by the very
helicopters which would now be deployed to the country. It would be an
excellent chance for those pilots and crews to gain experience.
Inoue nodded. Brusque and demanding as he was, he knew his people were good
at what they did and let them do the work. His in his mind was keeping a
leash on things and passing orders down and requests up to the Prime
Minister, a change from the usual order of things; it was normal for
Ministers to run their Ministries like private fiefs but Satos little
cabal at least worked differently including the Prime Minister in much of
the work they did.
How does this play with the budget? Inoue asked Watanabe.
Alone, its bearable, but Id like to remind everyone here that we are
deploying more and more and we will need more money in the operations budget
if this process is to continue.
Noted, Inoue said. But we can afford this mission?
Absolutely.
Alright the partnerships, who goes and where do we put the men who are
coming from Britain? asked Inoue.
Tanaka spoke first. Obviously those units and personnel most likely to see
deployment in a post-Article 9 setting would be the first choice. Is there
any sign of what the government is thinking about in the way of deployments
if the amendment passes.
I got a note from the Prime Minister after the cabinet meeting about White
Force to Lebanon.
White Force, was the working name in the Defence Agency for two battalion
sized composite force of infantry, armoured infantry, engineers and MPs
being developed by the Planning Bureau, the name was chosen because it was
designed to be part of a traditional UN peacekeeping mission. The Planning
Bureau however had nicknamed it the Bento Box, for its a little of
everything configuration.
Tanaka nodded. That was anticipated, making friends with China was a big
item on the governments agenda right now and some shoulder to shoulder
military cooperation would be a good chance to make some friends in the PLA.
Fukudome however frowned wondering if that situation might be a tinder box,
one friendly fire incident could set back relations by decades if handled
wrong.
Then I suggest we put the line officers and NCOs of White Force on the
observer list, Watanabe said.
I would wait, Fukudome said. We have yet to approach all our prospective
partners yet, and if we are successful in getting Israel to help us wouldnt
White Forces personnel be better sent to work with the IDF?
Inoue nodded. Agreed. On that matter do we have a full list of prospective
partner nations yet?
Watanabe nodded and pulled up a file on his PDA. Increasing joint
operations with the US, Britain, Canada, Australia, Thai
well well leave
them off for now, Peru and Israel.
Inoue nodded and took that list down himself to brief the Prime Minister
about later. Very good, we will talk later about how best to approach the
various governments.
Watanabe nodded.
Back to the British partnership, Inoue said.
Fukudome took the lead. The Western Army Infantry Regiment should be
considered for both British observation and advice and for sending personnel
to British units in Afghanistan.
Watanabe nodded. Makes sense, theyd be the most likely force to be sent to
the region if we did deploy.
Them and the Airborne, Fukudome said.
Inoue stroked his chin for a moment. If we were deploying a mixed force of
WAIR and Airborne to the region, whod lead it? he asked.
Brigadier Ohira would have command under precedent but he would likely
command the mission from Narashino, while Colonel Kimura of the WAIR would
be on the ground.
Make sure both men are sent to Afghanistan.
Is there any reason to suspect we might be going to Afghanistan? asked
Tanaka. It was mission he had watched closely and he knew it was losing
support in the west despite the successes of Operation Medusa. If the US and
Britain were pressuring the government about deploying overseas after the
referendum it was a likely place. Not as politically explosive as Iraq, but
still a useful place for Japanese boots to be put on the ground; deadly too,
he reminded himself.
No, Inoue answered carefully. But it never hurts to anticipate.
Yes sir, Tanaka said. Id like to suggest that Fukudome make a trip to
Britain to meet with the British planners and see how things are working on
that end of that operation as well.
Inoue nodded. Any objections Fukudome-Sho-sho? he asked.
None.
Consider it done so long as the British are willing. Now the rest of these
partnership deployments?
If we are anticipating a deployment to the region, I suggest we put it to
Kimura and Ohira to pick which units would likely see deployment to the
region and let them choose say 10 officers and 10 senior NCOs total from
those units and send them to work with the British.
Do we allow our observers to participate in combat? Inoue asked.
There were a few looks around the room before Tanaka spoke. They should be
armed, but our policy should be that they are there for observation only.
However if they should be attacked in the field, then they should not be
punished for participating.
Also there is the matter of communication, Fukudome said. While most of
our officers in the Airborne and the WAIR have done extensive training with
the Americans there is some question of the quality of their English which
would complicate their involvement in combat. In general, defence only, and
let the British decide how much exposure to danger is comfortable for them.
We dont want to have British soldiers killed minding our personnel.
Inoue nodded. Other branches?
The MSDF is the most experienced branch of the JSDF, and have done many of
the jobs the British are doing, Id say wed appreciate some help from the
British Naval Planning office to work and some cross over of captains from
our missile ships to theirs and I think theyd appreciate a chance to go
over a British carrier, Tanaka said.
Put it to Takayama, Inoue said. But in general I agree. ASDF?
We dont have much capability to deploy fighter or even support aircraft
that far a field, Tanaka said. I will speak with Terada and have his
recommendations on your desk tomorrow, but likely hed like some planning
and logistics people to talk to and have his people see how the British are
doing that in Afghanistan, that would most likely be the ASDFs role in a
Japanese led mission.
Inoue nodded. Good, speak with both Terada and Takayama and see what they
think. Is there anything else?
All the men shook their heads.
Alright then this meeting is adjourned. Watanabe, please remain we need to
discuss the expansion of the partnership program.
Actions:
1> Draw up plans for the deployment 10 CH-47Js and their required flight and
support staff from the 1st Helicopter Brigade to Afghanistan. Helicopters
and supplies will go by sea while the personnel will be flown ahead of them
to get the HQ element integrated into the command structure and educate the
pilots and ground crews about the conditions and their mission expectations.
2> Send: Brigadier General Ohira of the 1st Airborne Brigade to Afghanistan
to observe the British HQ and Colonel Kimura of the WAIR to observe the same
on the front lines with the objective of gaining some understanding of what
it takes to make an operation work in this environment.
3> Send: Brigadier General Fukudome to the British Army planning department
to observe mission planning for Afghanistan and Iraq and pick their brains
about the biggest problems they are facing in both theatres and how they are
trying to combat them.
4> Send: 10 line officers and 10 senior NCOs each from the 1st Airborne and
WAIR to observe combat and peacekeeping operations in Afghanistan to develop
first hand experience.
5> Otherwise let the partnership exchanges and observer postings go as both
sides see fit, focusing mostly on planning and logistics for the MSDF and
ASDF.
6> Approach the United States about instituting a similar partnership to
expand on the existing one.
7> Approach Canada, Peru, and Israel about similar partnerships each with a
different focus. Canada: Peackeeping advice, Peru: CT and anti-guerrilla
tactics and strategy, Israel: CT tactics and strategy.
_________________________________________________________________
Buy what you want when you want it on Sympatico / MSN Shopping
http://shopping.sympatico.msn.ca/content/shp/?ctId=2,ptnrid=176,ptnrdata=081805
More information about the War
mailing list