[War] Japan: "Tests"
Ian Martell
martellian at hotmail.com
Thu Sep 21 13:23:09 EDT 2006
Tests
Prime Minister Shunichi Sato
Japan
September 20th 2006
North Korea, Sato said as he flipped over the page. As you know weve
been receiving reports from KUSA about their nuclear capability.
KUSA was the codename for the KRF observation of the facility and only Sato,
Director Haruma, Minister Takezo and Minister Inoue knew who KUSA was in
reality, the rest were specifically not told, and many of them believed it
to be a source in the government in Pyongyang. If there was one thing Sato
had learned as Minister of Justice, who was amoung other things Japans top
spy, was that the fewer people who knew a secret the less likely it would be
revealed.
We have received an additional report last night that is in your book
today, that North Korea is planning a nuclear test.
There were a number of slightly stunned expressions on a few of the faces
around the table. Are they insane? asked Morimoto of the Ecconomic Policy
Board.
Thats been well established Yoshi, replied Takezo with a slight smile.
Yes, yes I know, said Morimoto. But to do that now, we would have no
choice but to take further actions against them. It makes no sense for them
to do that now.
I agree, can we trust this source? Yubuki asked Director Haruma.
I believe so, however the details were slim, we dont know when or where
the test will be or what kind of device that will be used.
May I suggest that we use this then as a test of KUSAs veracity? asked
Yubuki. If there is a test we know that they are capable of being both
correct and honest with us, if not, then we know to take their further
reports with a grain of salt.
Sato nodded. Yubuki had been a political choice but it seemed he was well
suited to the responsibilities appointed him.
I agree, Sato said.
Then we wont take any actions to stop the test? asked Cabinet Secretary
Ashiba.
No, Sato said. This is an excellent opportunity to test KUSA and every
bomb tested is one less that can be used on us.
Thatd put them at a total of 8-11 by the end of the year, said Haruma,
basing his estimates of the previous KUSA report on the North Korean nuclear
capability.
Also, a test at this juncture would be a chance for us to re-open the issue
of a total embargo on North Korea with our international allies, Yubuki
commented.
I am not sure further pressure is the wisest course, said Takezo. I think
that our sudden good relations with China have shaken the foundations of
their world-view and they are struggling to cope with their sudden
vulnerability, I believe this test is a response to that. A show of their
nuclear might so people take them seriously.
Then what do you suggest, asked Yubuki. Appeasement?
No, said Takezo cautiously. Promoting appeasement of North Korea was a
quick way to irrelevancy in the Sato government and everyone knew it. What
I am suggesting is caution so that we do not force a conflict we are not
ready for. After the test, we take the high road, we issue a statement to
the effect that we are unsurprised by North Koreas latest tantrum and
reiterate our desire for a peaceful resolution of our differences and invite
Kim Jong-Il to Tokyo for a summit. If he comes, then weve bought time for
our own preparations as we haggle over aid for disarmament terms that he
wont live by, if he refuses, we tried to make peace which is good for us
internationally, while in North Korea it reinforces their idea of a show of
force equalling concessions, which restores some of their confidence, which
should delay any escalation of hostilities.
My apologies, Yubuki said.
Sato nodded. Alright, I am willing to follow that game plan, but lets not
waste any opportunity this test gives us to make new friends and we quietly
gather support internationally for any expansion of the embargo we may
decide to take in the future.
The Council nodded its agreement.
Seeing as we will want as much intelligence as possible from this test, may
I suggest we spread the news of it to a few key countries, suggested
General Tanaka, Chairman of the Branch Chiefs. The United States, the UK,
and South Korea, all of their observation assets would be a benefit to us in
learning what we can about the blast.
I wouldnt recommend advising South Korea, said Haruma. Its my thinking
that they might leak the report to the press in an attempt embarrass the
North and stop the test, their primary commitment is to see a diplomatic end
to their disunity after all and I feel that a leak like that would be
dangerous to our source.
May I suggest a private warning to the South Korean President then, said
Takezo. Eventually theyll learn that we knew and we didnt tell them, I
think if it is a person to person conversation between Prime Minister Sato
and President Roh, we could express our need for secrecy and have it
respected, after all they will be as curious as we are to see this test.
I agree, I am also going to speak to President Hong, and gauge he countrys
reaction before the test, she mentioned in our summit if things got too out
of hand in North Korea she would send in a stabilizing force. This might
qualify for out of hand and Id like to know what is going to happen in
that regard.
Haruma cracked a smile.
Director? Sato asked.
Sorry Prime Minister, Im just thinking how odd it is to be reasonably
certain we can determine Chinas next move with a phone call.
Many of the council smiled and Sato replied. The world is a strange place
these days Haruma, lets hope that someday we can do the same with
Pyongyang.
Will Kim be on the other end of that phone Prime Minister? asked Takezo
with a smile.
Not if I can help it, Sato replied.
Actions:
1> Inform the US and the UK about the possibility of a nuclear bomb being
tested in North Korea in the near future and explain that secrecy is
requested due to the danger a leak would cause to the source. In the same
message inform them of the secondary Yongbyon reactor, enrichment site and
what weve learned about the Norths nuclear capability. Add to the US
briefing, that if they want to let South Korea know about the nuclear
capabilities of the North, leave the Japan part out.
2> Call the President of Korea personally inform him about the test and ask
for him to keep this news classified because of danger to the source.
3> Call President Hong (JP Chris?) and inform her of the test.
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