[War] India: The Strained Dialogue

[Daniel Garcia]

"India:  The Strained Dialogue"
President Ashwin Kanchwala, Republic of India
July 25, 2006

(OOC:  This was inspired by this http://news.ninemsn.com.au/ 
article.aspx?id=117031 [which was derived from http:// 
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/07/23/ 
AR2006072300737.html?sub=AR and http://www.isis-online.org/ 
publications/southasia/newkhushab.pdf, both released yesterday, July  
24] and parts of this mentioning the July 11 attacks http:// 
news.yahoo.com/s/nm/20060723/india_nm/india260678.)

Pakistan.  That one word, the country and people it represented, had  
caused uncountable numbers of headaches in the leaders of India since  
independence. These had largely but not completely revolved around  
the possession of Jammu & Kashmir, which both countries claimed, and  
four conflicts had been the result.

To date, Ashwin hadn't spent a whole lot of time on the issue.  For  
the first several weeks in office, he had played the usual ceremonial  
role that the President had always played.  However, when Ashwin had  
been forced to move beyond tradition in the wake of the events  
following the July 11 bombings in Mumbai, the issue of Pakistan  
suddenly loomed larger in his realm of responsibilities.  To that  
end, he was expecting Samir, his Prime Minister, to arrive for a  
lunch time discussion of recent developments.

The knock on the door brought Ashwin out of his reverie.  Shaking his  
head, he got up and went to the door, opening it when he got there.

"Hello, Ashwin, been waiting long," Samir asked jovially, extending  
his hand.  Ashwin took it familiarly.

"Not long enough for the business we'll be discussing I'm sure,"  
Ashwin shot back.  As he walked Samir to the table where they'd eat  
and talk, he remarked, "I assume you let them know what you'd be  
eating?"

"Yes, yes," Samir said, obviously wanting to get on to the  
discussion.  He had never been big on meals, viewing them as simply  
something required in order to be able to do everything else there  
was to do.

"Well, then, what word is there of Pakistan," Ashwin said, as the  
pair of old friends sat down.

"Oh, lots of fun words.  Wanna start with where the police and  
intelligence have been heading with the Mumbai bombings," Samir  
started.  Ashwin winced at the mention and memory of the July 11  
bombings in Mumbai.  He winced because the tragedy, taking place as  
it did in his home town while his wife had been in the city without  
him, had raked him over some tender emotional ground.  And he winced  
because it had been the spark of the final confrontation between  
himself and the previous caretaker Prime Minister, Pandit.  It had  
been that confrontation which had made worrying about Pakistan jump  
up his list of duties significantly.

"Let me guess," Ashwin said, having been briefed earlier, "Pakistan.   
Part of the problem with that, of course, is that there is something  
of a bias in this country against Muslims in general and Pakistan in  
particular."

It wasn't that simple, or that absolute, but it was true enough.  Go  
through enough wars, and it was bound to happen.  Still, it left a  
bad taste in his mouth, and the speed with which the trail had  
started pointing towards India's not so friendly neighbor had brought  
doubts to Ashwin's mind, however legitimate the allegations might be.

"Of course.  The Pakistanis' quick condemnation of the attacks aside,  
a lot of the prime suspects hail from the banks of the Indus," Samir  
said.  "Hell, I wouldn't even say it's the government's fault, and  
I'd even be willing to say that Musharraf is genuinely sympathetic.   
But they have some serious problems over there, and some parts of  
their country simply aren't firmly under their control.  Not that  
they don't try, and not that Musharraf doesn't aspire to more Western  
values."

"So what are we supposed to do, lecture them yet again," Ashwin said,  
knowing that unless the Pakistani government itself was implicated,  
there was little anyone in India could really do.

"Well, we just keep it in mind, and let the investigation continue,"  
Samir said, trying to brighten the spirits of his friend and  
President in the midst of this most assuredly dim spirited subject.   
"When we have a firmer conclusion, then we bring it up with them, and  
do what we can.  In the meantime, there are other matters."

"Such as," Ashwin asked.  He didn't like the response.

"A story yesterday in the American Washington Post newspaper  
highlighted a report, also released yesterday, by independent defense  
analysts showing what appeared to be the construction of a new heavy  
water nuclear reactor at an existing nuclear site, Khushab.  The site  
already produces about 10 to 15 kg of plutonium annually, enough for  
two or three bombs, but from the report's estimates, based on  
satellite imagery and guesswork based on existing designs, the new  
reactor could pump that number up to over 200 kg a year.  Of course,  
to date much of their effort has been in uranium based bombs, where  
they've been producing enough material for at least four bombs each  
year, but this would obviously be a big boon to their nuclear  
program," Samir summarized.  Ashwin was at a loss for a moment.  This  
was the first time that the issue of nuclear warfare had loomed large  
for him, and already he wasn't liking it.

"Tell me, Samir, how bad would this be," Ashwin said.  He didn't know  
a whole lot about India's own stockpile as of yet, but it looked as  
though he was about to get a quick lesson.

"Well to date we've had a slight advantage in the number of warheads,  
at maybe 120 to their 60, or thereabouts.  Of course, we also have  
China to worry about where Pakistan and China have generally been  
friendly.  And we've generally been producing material at about the  
same rate, perhaps seven bombs worth a year.  Of course, we had a ten  
year head start," Samir said.  "But if, and there is a question of  
their intentions here, if they use this reactor for materials  
production, and it's everything that it's being made out to be,  
they'd catch up and pass us awfully quick.  They have been trying to  
keep this quiet, as construction has been ongoing since 2000, but  
that could swing both ways."

"So basically, there are three possibilities," Ashwin said.  "Either,  
and I hope this is the case but probably isn't, they have no  
intention to use the reactor for bomb making, and things continue as  
they are, or they intend to use the reactor for making bombs, and  
either we work to make more bombs or get left behind."

"That's pretty much it," Samir said.  Here there was a knock on the  
door.  Samir called out that it was alright to come in, and a waiter  
came in to deliver the pair's meals, and then left promptly.  There  
was a moment of silent eating before the discussion continued.

"Of course," Samir started, "we also have to worry about the Chinese,  
who can nuke us back to the stone age without us being able to  
retaliate effectively.  We can't reach Beijing, but they can hit us  
wherever they want."

"So what do we do," Ashwin said, pushing images of China's nuclear  
weapons out of his head.

"Well, you *do* have a say," Samir teased.  "But I think we need to  
call Pakistan out, and get them to say what exactly they intend to do  
with that plant when it's finished."

"So, we request, nicely, politely, and with firmness and a flash of  
teeth, that they commit to refraining from using the new reactor for  
weapons purposes," Ashwin said.  Samir nodded, and Ashwin continued.   
"It would also help if we insinuated that a refusal to make such a  
commitment, coupled with everything else that's been coming out of  
their country, might provoke us into trying to match and exceed them."

"An arms race," Samir said with a raised eyebrow.

"Hopefully not, but they have to realize that if they bring  
themselves up a notch, then we just might bring ourselves up by two,"  
Ashwin said.  "Of course, we have to say all this in an at least  
outwardly nice fashion, and offer them something to coax them to  
agree with us."

"What are you thinking," Samir asked.

"Well, listen, I don't like nuclear weapons.  I don't know anyone who  
does," Ashwin said.  "So, we offer Pakistan a nuclear pact.  We offer  
to let each of us inspect the other, or to have international  
inspections, and to cap the number of bombs a year that we produce,  
and maybe even set a cap on the number of bombs each of us can hold.   
Or whatever the Pakistanis might be interested in."

"Maybe," Samir said, expressing some skepticism.  "But why would they  
bite?"

"Well, for one thing because it's right.  And," Ashwin said with a  
wide grin, "because nuclear arms races are expensive things.  There  
are reactors to build, bombs to make and store and maintain, missiles  
that need development and testing.  It's expensive, and we're not the  
United States.  Moreover, if it *is* going to be such a contest,  
there has to be someone in Islamabad who can do the math.  Our  
economy is almost seven times larger than theirs, our budget six  
times larger.  And the gap continues to grow as our economy has been  
growing even faster than theirs has, which is to say pretty fast."

"I suppose so," Samir said, deferring to Ashwin, who was the expert  
when it came to economics.  "But there very well might *not* be  
someone who is willing to do the math over there.  As we've already  
said, they're not in full control over there."

"True enough," Ashwin admitted.  "But nuclear chicken is a terrible  
game to play."


ACTIONS:

1)  Request *cough* that Pakistan commit to not using its upcoming  
new Khushab nuclear plant to make material for weapons.

2)  Suggest a nuclear pact that would involve either bilateral or  
international inspections of weapon material production, with an  
agreed allowance of about 10 bombs worth a year, up to some maximum  
amount of bomb material.

3)  Warn that refusal to agree to commit to not using the new Khushab  
reactor for bomb material, coupled with the recent souring of  
relations after the July 11 attacks and Pakistan's inability or  
unwillingness to reign in militants operating and recruiting in  
Pakistan, could prompt India to both improve its nuclear capability  
and mean the end of the recent improvement of relations.